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PROTECTING THE GENDER NONCONFORMIST
FROM THE GENDER POLICE-WHY THE
HARASSMENT OF GAYS AND OTHER GENDER
NONCONFORMISTS IS A FORM OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION IN LIGHT OF THE SUPREME
COURT'S DECISION IN ONCALE V. SUNDOWNER
TONI LESTER*
INTRODUCTION-THE SILENCE SURROUNDING HARASSMENT BASED
ON HOMOPHOBIA
Traditionally, people who are harassed at work because they are gay1 have found
that they have not been granted the same kind of legal protections that their
heterosexual counterparts have received.2 This is true despite the fact that the sexual
harassment of gays is motivated by homophobia, which in turn is motivated in large
part by misogyny. Since misogyny in all its many manifestations is one of the things
that Title VUI's prohibition against sex discrimination is supposed to attack,3 the
failure of the courts to recognize that harassment against gays is a kind of sex
discrimination is at best misguided and at worst very dangerous. This lack of

* Affiliated Research Scholar Wellesley Centers for Women; former Visiting Law Scholar, Institute for
Research on Women and Gender, Stanford University; Associate Professor of Law, and Johnson Research Chair,
Babson College; B.S., J.D., Georgetown University.
1. I use the term "gay" hem broadly to mean those who identify themselves as homosexual men, lesbians,
bisexuals, and transsexuals. I recognize that the term is the subject of great debate today, however. I will talk about
the debate and explain my use of the term in greater detail in Part L
2. See Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084-86 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that Title VII does
not protect transsexuals, homosexuals or transvestites); Desantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30
(9th Cir. 1979) (stating that 'Title VIIs prohibition of "sex" discrimination... should not be judicially extended
to include sexual preference"); see also Regina L Stone-Harris, Same-Sex Harassment-The Next Step in the
Evolution of Sexual HarassmentLaw Under Title VII, 28 ST. MARY'S LJ. 269, 289 (1996) (stating that in dealing
with "hostile or abusive work environment claims" brought by a male victim against a male offender "who believed
the victim was homosexual," courts have 'ule[d] against the plaintiff," with the author finding it "notable... how
closely the offensive conduct [in these cases] parallels other conduct which courts have found to be
discriminatory").
3. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) ("An employer who objects to
aggressiveness in women but whose positions require this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible
catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not. Title VII lifts women out of this
bind."); Meritor v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) ("Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive
environment for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial
harassment is to racial equality." (citing Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (1 th Cir. 1982))); Ellison v. Brady,
924 F.2d 872, 881 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Congress designed Title VII to prevent the perpetuation of stereotypes and a
sense of degradation which serve to close or discourage employment opportunities for women." (citing Andrews
v. Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3d Cir. 1990))); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(noting that "[n]umerous studies have shown that women are placed in the less challenging, the less responsible
and the less remunerative positions on the basis of their sex alone," and finding "such blatantly disparate treatment
: .. particularly objectionable in view of the fact that Title VII has specifically prohibited sex discrimination since
its enactment in 1964."); Tones v. Nat'l Precision Blanking, 943 F. Supp. 952, 954 (N.D. I. 1996) (stating that
"the principal purpose of including the term 'sex' in the Act was to 'do some good for the minority sex."' (citing
110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964))).
Some have argued that Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination was the result of a fluke, in which
Congressman Howard Smith of Virginia hoped to stymie the bill's passage by adding the word, "sex" to the bill,
never expecting it to be approved. See CHARLES & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE-A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS Acr 115-118 (1985).
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judicial recognition is misguided because there is ample theoretical and empirical
evidence to support the4 idea that homophobia is, in the words of author Susan Pharr,
"a weapon of sexism." It is dangerous because it sends a message to homophobes
that they can taunt, assault, ridicule and discriminate against gays at work with
relative impunity.
There is a great deal of silence in the empirical data produced in the United
States about the extent to which the harassment of gays at work takes place. This
silence, however, is more indicative of the fact that the powers that be have refused
to face this issue head on rather than the fact that the problem is minor or
nonexistent. For example, in one of the most well known studies on sexual
harassment, conducted by the federal government in 1988, the respondents were
asked to list their sex, marital status and job classification. However, they were not
asked the sex of their harasser, if they were gay, whether or not their harasser knew
or believed that they were gay, and whether or not the content of any verbal
harassment they were subjected to was homophobic in nature.5
One of the main things this study revealed is that the sexual harassment of
women is a serious problem.6 Unfortunately, in doing so, the equally important
point that a great deal of harassment is being perpetuated against women because
they are or are perceived to be lesbians was masked. Also, the studies failed to
entertain the notion that a high percentage of the smaller levels of harassment
against men may in fact be largely motivated by homophobic animus.7

4. See SuSAN PHARR, HOMOPHOBIA, A WEAPON OF SEXISM (1988). I do not mean to imply that
homophobia is only based on sexism, however. For example, there are also important connections between
homophobia, racism and classism. See Kan Fhanklin, UnassumingMotivations-Contextualizingthe Narratives
of Antigay Assailants, in STIGMA AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION-UNDERSTANDING PREJUDICE AGAINST LESBIANS,
GAY MEN AND BisE uALS 1,15-20 (Gregory M. Herck ed., 1998) [hereinafter STIGMA AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION]
(discussing the connections between race, class and homophobia). This paper will also examine some of the ways
in which racism and nationalism relate to homophobia, but its focus will be primarily on the connection between
sexism and homophobia.
5. See U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, Sexual Harassmentin the FederalGovernment: An Update,
app. 1 at 6,9, 11 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 Report] (on file with author). A 1995 follow-up to that study did ask
harassment victims to list the sex of their harassers, but again neglected to ask them to fist their own sexual
orientation, whether or not their harassers knew if they were gay or if the content of verbal harassment was
homophobic. See U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, Sexual Harassmentin the FederalWorkplace-Trends,
Progressand Continuing Challenges,app. 1 at 61, and app. 4 at 71 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Report] (on file with
author).
6. See 1995 Report at 13 (stating that of the 8000 federal government employees who responded to the
survey, 44% of the women and 19% of the men said that they had been sexually harassed); 1988 Report at 1-2
(discussing similar results); see also Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of
Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L REV. 1183, 1198 n.57 (1989) (discussing similar studies about female harassment
victims done by Barbara Gutek). In fact, these studies have been cited by feminists and some judges to advocate
for the use of a reasonable woman test in sexual harassment law. Such a test would take into account the
experiences of female harassment victims in contrast to the traditional approach, where more weight is given to
the male harasser's perspective. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881 n.15 (9th Cir. 1991); Rabidue v. Osceola
Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 626-27, (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, I.,
dissenting); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760
F. Supp. 1486, 1524-25 (M.D. Fla. 1991); Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L REV. 813 (1991); Kim Lane
Schleppe, The Reasonable Woman, in I THE RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY 36, 41 (Fall 1991).
7. These studies have also masked the extent to which other identities, such as race, also influence the
nature of the harassment in question.
I too have been guilty of collapsing the two categories--sex and sexual orientation-and focusing exclusively
on the category "woman" in the past. See generally Toni Lester, The Reasonable Woman in Sexual Harassment
Law, 26 IND. L REV. 227 (1993) [hereinafter Lester, The Reasonable Woman]. But see Toni Lester, Efficient But
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Studies from other countries support my suspicion. For example, 48% of 2000
gay employees reported having been harassed at work because of their sexuality in
a survey in the United Kingdom conducted by the gay rights group, Stonewall
Furthermore, even though we have little empirical data to document the harassment
of gays at work in the United States, we do have data about hate crimes committed
against gays in the society at large. According to recent FBI reports, for instance,
hate crimes against gays in general are on the rise." And violence against gay youth
is such a serious problem that it causes them to be two to three times more likely to
try to commit suicide then other young people.' ° No doubt, the experiences of gay
youth parallel the underreported experiences of gay adults in the working world.
Nevertheless, to date, there is no federal law that directly prohibits employment
discrimination against gays, and only nine states plus the District of Columbia do
so." A congressional bill was proposed in 1994 that would create a new law, the
Employment Non-Discrimination Act, to prohibit discrimination in employment
based on sexual orientation, but it was not passed. 2 This is why the Supreme
Court's 1997 decision to grant certiorari in Oncale v. Swidowner Offshore Services,
Inc. 3 was such an important development for gay rights advocates. In Oncale, the
Court had the chance to explicitly recognize the connection between sexism and
homophobia and find that Title ViI's prohibitions against sex discrimination
includes the sexual harassment of gays.

Not Equitable-The Dangersof Using the Law and Economics Paradigmto InterpretSexual Harassmentin the
Work Place,22 VT. L REV. 519 n.101 (1998) [hereinafter Lester, Efficient But Not Equitable] (recognizing that
"in addition to hetersexually based harassment and racial harassment, there is harassment triggered by
homophobic animus or religious intolerance.... I would... ask that feminists and critical race theorists also
examine the interlocking systems of domination that relate to race, sex, religious and class intolerance, as well as
homophobia.").
8. See Equalityfor Lesbians and Gay Men in the Workplace, 74 EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES REV., July-Aug.
1997, at 20-21 [hereinafter EqualityforLesbians].
9. See Manny Fernandez, Hate CrinesReported in State Jump 17%, FBISays, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 9, 1998,
at A17. It should be noted, though, that it is only recently that hate crimes against gays have been reported
officially. Furthermote, many activists believe that the actual level of crimes is underreported, because many gay
crime victims are afraid that if they report crimes, they will become more visible, and as a consequence, more
vulnerable to attack. See id; see alto HATE CRIMES: CONFRONTING VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN
(Gregory M. Herek & Kevin T. Berrill eds., 1992) [hereinafter HATE CRIMES]; James D. Wilson, Gays Under Fire,
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 14, 1992, at 35-39.
10. See Anthony R. D'Augelli, Developmental Implicationsof Victimization of Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual
Youth, in STIGMA AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION, supra note 4, at 187, 200-202 (saying that one study showed that
almost one-half of lesbian and gay male adults report having experienced some form of victimization in school,
and that another study of New York State junior and senior high school students showed that one-third of them said
that they had witnessed acts of violence against actual or perceived gay students and teachers); Franklin, supra note
4, at 1-2 (citing study of 484 San Francisco Bay Area community college students, in which 10% admitted to
having engaged in physical violence against gays and 23.5% admitted that they had participated in name-calling
directed at gays); see also Eve Sedgwick, How To Bring Your Kids Up Gay, in FEAR OF A QUEER PLANEr--QuEER
POLMICS AND SOCIAL THEORY 69 (Michael Warner ed., 1993) (iscussing a 1989 report on youth suicide issued
by the United States Department of Health).
11. Those states ar California, Connecticut Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, Rhode Island,
Vermont, and Wisconsin. See Daniel C. Sanpietro, Note, "Gradually Triumphing Over Ignorance": Rhode
Island's Treatment of Sexal Orientation Discriminationin the Workplace, 30 SUFFOLK U. L REV. 439,440 n.3
(1997).
12. See S. 2238, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); Employment DiscriminationAgainst Gays and Lesbians:
Hearing on the Employment Non-DiscriminationAct of 1994, S. 2238, Before the Senate Comm. on Laborand
Human Resources, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
13. 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted,520 U.S. 1263 (1997), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
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Oncale involved a case of male on male harassment, with the victim, a
heterosexual white male, being sexually harassed because he failed to conform to
stereotypical ideas about what it means to be a man in our society. 4 Since gay men
are often harassed for the same reasons, 5 the Supreme Court could have issued a
clear statement that harassment against gays, and anyone else who is perceived as
or accused of being gay because they fail to conform to cultural stereotypes about
sex-based roles, is impermissible sex discrimination.
Unfortunately, the Court did not do that. While it did say that the type of samesex harassment experienced by Oncale could be a type of sex discrimination under
Title VII, it said that he could only win his claim if he proved at trial, among other
things, that he was discriminated against because of his sex. 6 On the issue of
whether or not the policing of Oncale's gender nonconformity, vis-h-vis his being
sexually harassed, constituted harassment "because of sex," the Court remained
silent. Nevertheless, some gay rights advocates hailed the decision. 7
While I too applaud the decision for reaffirming the rights of sexual harassment
victims in general, I think the belief that gay people now enjoy a comprehensive
legal right to be free from harassment at work is premature. I do, however, interpret
the Court's silence to mean that the door has been left open for plaintiff's counsel
to introduce evidence about the connection between homophobia and sexism at
trial." Even though this means that gay rights advocates now have to engage in the
expensive and time consuming task of tackling this issue case by case, circuit by
circuit, it is a battle worth fighting and one that has a good chance of being won.
A great deal has been written in fields as diverse as history, sociology,
psychology and literature, about how cultural stereotypes, defining what it means
to be a "real man" or a "real woman" in our society, lead to anxiety about and
discrimination against those who do not conform to those stereotypes. In this paper,
I will describe this work and use it to show how lawyers advocating for gay
harassment victims and judges deciding these cases can use it to bolster their
arguments that harassment against gays and other gender nonconformists (GNC's)
is a form of sex discrimination under Title VII.
The plan of this paper is as follows: In Part I, I will explain what I mean when
I use the term "gay" and how this definition relates to gender nonconformity in
general and to the ensuing discrimination that it provokes. In Part II, I will describe
the Oncale case in more detail and place it within the larger context of sex
discrimination law in general and sexual harassment law in particular. Here I will
also talk further about my concerns about the Oncale case and the challenges that
it poses for lawyers who represent gay harassment victims, challenges that I hope

14. See Brief of Petitioner, 1997 WL 45$82, at *3-6, *27-28, *30 n.38, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Sen's., 118 S.Ct. 998 (1998) (No. 96-568).
15. See discussion infra, Part HI.
16. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
17. See Linda Greenhouse, High Court Widens Workplace Claims in Sex Harassment,N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
5, 1998, at Al, A17 (quoting Matt Coles, Director of the ACLU's gay rights project).
18. See Marcia Coyle, Victor in Court's Same-Sex Ruling FacesTough Trial, NAT'L LJ., Mar. 16, 1998,
at A10 (citing Fordham law professor, Katherine Frank, who says that one way Oncale's attorney can argue the case
is to say that "a particular man frequently gets picked on because he is perceived as not masculine enough, less than
a normal man-[and that this is a kind ofl intrasexual stereotyping.").
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can be overcome with the use of the kind of evidence connecting sexism to
homophobia that I will discuss in Part II. I will end with some conclusions and
recommendations for lawyers, policy makers and judges dealing with these issues.
PART I: DEFINING GAY IDENTITY AND GENDER NONCONFORMITY-THE CONSTRUCTIVIST VS. THE ESSENTIALIST DEBATE
Some scholars have argued that people who fit my definition of the term "gay"
9
have existed since the beginning of time and across cultures. This view of
homosexuality is a form of essentialism because it posits that there is some type of
essential or trans-historical notion of homosexual culture, a culture which has "a
natural existence serving the eternal social needs . . .of a fixed minority of
people."'2 Courts in the United States have a long-standing practice of viewing
homosexuality in essentialist terms. For example, when the Supreme Court of
Hawaii recognized the right of two people of the same sex to marry in 1993, the
essentialist definition of gay identity used by the court was that "homosexuality 2is1
sexual desire or behavior directed toward a person or persons of one's own sex."
In addition to the question of whether homosexuality has some type of underlying
cross-cultural or cross-historical component, is the question of whether homosexuality is caused by purely biological or by purely cultural factors. Essentialists tend to
believe that homosexuality is based on "biological forces and consider sexual
identities to be cognitive realizations of genuine, underlying differences . ..."'
Thus, they argue that the gay person has some "gay 'core' of their being, or their
psyche, or their genetic make-up, 2 3 and that homosexual orientation is a "deeprooted, fixed, and intrinsic feature of individuals .. .determined (by nature or
nurture), not chosen. ' 24
25
Social constructionists, however, disagree with the essentialist approach. Some
take the extreme position that there is absolutely no natural or biological basis for
homosexuality or heterosexuality-no magic gene, present at birth, that makes a
person gay or straight.26 Most, however, believe that sexuality is the result of a
complicated combination of biological and cultural factors, and because cultural
factors play such a significant role in the development of sexuality, great weight

19. See e.g., JOHN BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY,SOciALTOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUAIIY (1980); JONATHAN
KATZ, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY: LESBIANS AND GAY MEN IN THE USA (1976). But see John Boswell, Categories,

Experience and Sexuality, in FORMS OF DESIRE-SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST
CONTROVERSY 132-173 (Edward Stein ed., 1990) [hereinafter FORMS OF DESIRE] (explaining in part and refuting
in part criticism that his 1987 book took an essentialist approach to homosexuality).
20.

JEFFREY WEEKS, AGAINST NATURE-ESSAYS ON HISTORY, SExuAIrY AND IDENTrrY 15 (1991).

21. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 52 n.11 (1993) (citing WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 680 (1989)).
22. Stephen Epstein, Gay Politics, Ethnic Identity: The imits of Social Constructionism,in FORMS OF
DESIRE, supra note 19, at 241.
23. Id at 242.
24. Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument From
Immutability, 46 STAN. L R. 503, 516 (1994).
25. See Carol S. Vance, SocialConstructionTheory and Sexuality, in CONSTRUCTNG MAscuuY 37-48
(Maurice Berger et al. eds., 1995).
26. See id
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needs to be given to these factors in any critical analysis of sexuality. 27 I tend to

agree with this view.28
People like Mary MacKintosh, Jeffrey Weeks, Michel Foucault and Alan Bray
have argued that the view of homosexuality as a distinct species and culture is a
relatively recent product of western history.29 They and other social constructionists
would say that we are now at the juncture of a unique time in western history, when
being gay is associated with not only same-sex sexual activity, but also a comprehensive approach to life in general. This orientation involves a host of psychosocial
and cultural attributes shaped in large part by a shared history of oppression°--an
oppression that has been facilitated by various societal sanctions and controls. 3' The
harassment of gays and other GNC's at work is but one type of societal sanction or
control.
Building on the work of people like Foucault are "queer theorists", like Judith
Butler32 and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick.33 They argue that "sexuality exists on a
continuum . . . [and that] it is only since the 19th century [that] . . . sexual
definitions became rigid. And along with this rigidity... has come anxiety, panic
and intensifying homophobic attitudes."' As one writer has put it, queer theory
does not offer a "new and improved version of lesbian and gay, but rather
... questions the assumption that those descriptors are self-evident.... Its principal

27. See id.
28. Most social constructionists also believe that it is presumptuous to conclude that people who engaged
in same sex behavior in the past were gay in the same sense that we use that term now. Thus, according to
anthropologist Kath Weston, "to say 'I am a gay person' assumes the infusion of sexuality into total personhood
in a way that might be incomprehensible to someone who touches the genitals of another man or woman in a
society without a word for such an action." Kath Weston, Lesbian/GayStudies In The House of Anthropology, 22
ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 339, 347 (1993). An observer who tries to project his or her own associations and
meanings onto the behaviors of people from different times or cultures, thus does so "at great peril." See Vance,
supra note 25, at 42.
29. See MICHELRFOUCAULT, THE HIsTORY OF SExuALTY: VoLumE 143 (1978) (tracing the origins of this
view to the nineteenth century); ANNAMARI JAGOSE, QUEER THEORY-AN INTRODUCrION 10-12 (1996) (citing
ALAN BRAY, HoMosExuALxry IN RENAIssANcE ENGLAND 84 (1982), which places the starting point in the
seventeenth century); JEFFREY WEEKS, COMING OUT: HOMOSEXUAL POnrrlcs INBRIrAIN FROM THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY To THE PRESENT 3 (1977) (tracing the view's origins in the nineteenth century); Mary MacKintosh, The
Homosexual Role, 16 J. OF Soc. PROB. 182, 183 (1968). All of these analyses are primarily about developments
that pertain to European men only.
30. See WEEIS, supra note 20, at 104 ("Modern lesbian and gay identities are ... ways of grappling with
a legacy of social hostility, discrimination and prejudice, which have in turn produced a variety of different ways
of life.").
31. In what has now become a famous quote, Foucault said that in the Nineteenth Century:
Legal sanctions against minor perversions were multiplied, sexual irregularity was annexed to
mental illness; from childhood to old age, a nom of sexual development was defined and all the
possible deviations were carefully described; pedagogical controls and medical treatments were
organized; around the least fantasies, moralists, but especially doctors, brandished the whole
emphatic vocabulary of abomination.
FOUCAULT, supra note 29, at 36.
32. See generally JUDITH BUiiER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERION OF IDENTrrY (1990)
(reexamining institutions, practices and discourses that define gender issues).
33. See generally EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGy OF THE CLOsEr (1990) (arguing that an indepth understanding of Western culture must include a discussion on homo/heterosexual issues).
34. See Dinitia Smith, Queer Theory Is Entering The Literary Mainstream, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1991, at
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achievement is to draw attention to the assumptions that . . . inhere in the
mobilization of any identity category ... 35
It should be noted that all of the above scholars are white and that most of their
research and scholarship has focused almost exclusively on white gay men and
women. Thus, adding a necessary and important dimension to this debate are gay
people of color who say that the word "gay" has been used as a code word for
"white gay man and woman" in the same way that "woman" has been used to only
talk about middle class white women in feminist scholarship.36 This practice,
according to psychology professor Beverly Greene, has lead to the disturbing result
that "lesbians and gay men who are members of ethnic minority groups ... find
themselves and their concerns as invisible in scholarly research ... as they often
find themselves in the faces of their respective communities. 31
Furthermore, some writers have also been critical of gay male writers for either
ignoring the lesbian experience altogether or incorrectly concluding that their theses
apply equally to both men and women. 3' Lastly, other newer voices are being added
to the list of those who reject the idea that there is one monolithic gay identity. For
example, there are those who complain that the traditional definition of gay fails to
include bisexuals, transsexuals, transgendered people, and people of other sexual
usually associated with "old guard" definitions of homosexuality and
orientation not
39
lesbianism.
While I also firmly believe that historical and cultural relativity, the fluidity of
sexual identity, race, gender, ethnicity, and class all must be taken into account in

35. JAGOSE, supra note 29, at 126.
36. See Beverly Greene, Lesbians and Gay Men of Color: The Legacy of Ethnosexual Mythologies and
Heterosexism, in PREVENTING HErEROSEXISM AND HoMOPHOBIA, 59-61 (Esther Rothblum & Lynne Bond eds.,

1996); Sharon Holland, Humanity Is Not a Luxury: Some Thoughts on a Recent Passing, in TILTING THE TOWER
168-176 (Linda Garber ed., 1994). See generally ALL THE WOMEN ARE WHITE, ALL THE BLACKS ARE MEN, BUT
SOME OF US ARE BRAVE-BLACK WOMEN'S STUDIES (Gloria T. Hull et al. eds., 1982); THIS BRIDGE CALLED MY
BACK: WRITINGS BY RADICAL WOMEN OF COLOR (Cherrie Moraga & Gloria Anzaldua eds., 1984).

37. Greene, supranote 36, at 60.
38. See, e.g., BERNADETTE J. BROOTEN, LoVE BETWEEN WOMEN-EARLY CHRISTIAN RESPONSES TO

FEMALE HOMOEROTICISM 10-14 (1996) (criticizing John Boswell's CHRISTIAN TOLERANCE OF HOMOSEXUAuTY
(1980) and SAME-SEX UNIONS IN PRE-MODERN EUROPE (1995) for lacking any significant gender analysis,
especially about the ways in which ecclesiastical tolerance of male homosexuality and same-sex unions on the one
hand, and either inattention or condemnation of female homosexuality on the other, could be related to the kind
of access to privilege and power that certain men, but not women, enjoyed during the time period under review);
Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality,in BLOOD, BREAD AND POETRY 53 (1986) (finding commonality,

but with differences).
[Plart of the history of lesbian existence is ... to be found where lesbians, lacking a coherent
female community, have shared a kind of social life and common cause with homosexual men.
But there are differences: women's lack of economic and cultural privilege relative to men;
[and] qualitative differences in female and male relationships.
Rich, supra at 53.
39. See, e.g., ARLENE STEIN, SEX AND SENSIBILITY 190-191 (1997) (finding in her interviews with selfidentified lesbians from a variety of socioeconomic and ethnic backgrounds that members of what she calls the "90s
generation" are much more "tolerant of 'slippages' of identity in general-of inconsistencies among identity,
desires and sexual practices-than their baby boom predecessors" and also celebrate "bisexuality"; see also
generally JAY PROSSER, SECOND SKINS: THE BODY NARRATIVES OF TRANSSEXUALITY (1998) (highlighting the

important ways in which transsexuals are different from gay people); BI BY ANY OTHER NAME (Loraine Hutchins
& Lani Kaahumanu eds., 1991); Gilbert Herdt & Andrew Boxer, Bisexuality-TowardA Comparative Theory Of
Identitiesand Culture, in CONCEIVING SExuALruY-APPROACHES TO SEX RESEARCH IN A POSTMODERN WORLD

69 passim (Richard Parker & John Gagnon eds., 1995).
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the determination of whether there is such a thing as a distinct gay identity, what I
want to focus on here is the extent to which someone is accused of being gay by
others. My definition of the term at the beginning of this section is thus a practical
device for summarizing a widely held societal definition of gay identity.
In a variety of institutional and cultural settings, people who are gay or perceived
to be gay are treated like gender nonconforming traitors who deserve to be
subjected to ridicule, scorn and oppression.' It is the mentality of the homophobe
that I examine here, not the mentality of the victim--a person who may actually be
living and experiencing a life that directly contradicts the homophobe's stereotypical attitudes about that life.
Whether it takes the form of discrimination with respect to being able to get or
keep a job,4 one's participation in the political process,42 the perpetuation of
negative stereotypes in popular culture43 or outright violence," homophobia arises
in a variety of societal contexts. The rest of this paper will focus on how this
dynamic is manifested with respect to sexual harassment in the work place and how
it relates to sexism and sex discrimination.

40. See Jeanine C. Cogan, The Prevention of Anti-LesbianIGay Hate Crimes, in PREVENTING
HEIEROSEXISM, supra note 36 at 221. See generally STIGMA AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION, supra note 4 (containing
numerous articles discussing empirical work on homophobia and discrimination against gays).
41. See Aaron Epstein, Justices Deny Lesbian Lawyer's Appeal, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 13, 1998,
at 6A (discussing lesbian lawyer Robin Sharar's failure to win her U.S. Supreme Court appeal of Georgia Supreme
Court's decision that it was legal for the state Attorney General to deny her a job because she was a lesbian).
42. See, e.g., Maine Rejects Gay Rights, USA TODAY, Feb. 11, 1998, at 3A (reporting that conservative
groups in Maine successfully overturned a law that prohibited discrimination against gay people, with leaders of
the petition effort saying that the anti-discrimination law "bestow[ed] special rights on an undeserving group and
undermine[d] morality"). The constitutionality of referendums like the one in Maine are questionable, however,
because the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a similar law passed by Colorado voters in 1996. See Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996) (holding that a voter-initiated amendment to the Colorado constitution, making it
legal to discriminate against gays, violated the U.S. Constitution).
43. For a discussion of how homophobic attitudes are prevalent in popular film, see Vrro RuSso, THE
CELLULOID CLOSET (2d ed. 1987).

44. See HATE CRIMES, supra note 9 (discussing nature, reasons and extent of hate crimes against gay people
in the United States); Fernandez, supra note 9. One woman's personal narrative can give more color to these
statistics. Claudia Brenner, in her book, EIGHT BU.ErS, tells the story of how, while on a camping trip with her
female lover in the 1980s, the two women were attacked at gun point by a man who saw them kissing. See CLAUDIA
BRENNER, EIGHT BULLETS-ONE WOMAN'S STORY OF SURVIVING ANTI-GAY VIOLENCE (1995) [EDITOR'S NOTE:

Unless otherwise noted, the facts that follow refer to this citation, and so permeate the work that pinpoint citation
is impractical]. He shot both women several times, seriously injuring Brenner and killing her lover. At the murder
trial, the defense attorney argued that the killer had become so overcome with repulsion and rage when he saw the
two women kissing-something that he argued was a normal and understandable reaction-that the murder was
justified.
While the jury ultimately convicted the murderer and rejected the defense's arguments, it is important to note
that the judge considered the arguments relevant enough to the question of guilt that he allowed the jury to consider
them, something that he did not have to do. Thus, in addition to having to live with the trauma of being a victim
of gay-bashing of the worst kind, Brenner had to sit and listen to testimony that depicted her and her lover as
perverted freaks who deserved to be shot.
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PART II: HOW DISCRIMINATION AGAINST GAYS AND OTHER GENDER
NONCONFORMISTS HAS BEEN TREATED IN SEX DISCRIMINATION
AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW
The Desantis and Price Waterhouse Decisions
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits, among other things, sex
discrimination in employment.45 As I said previously, courts generally have
concluded that discrimination against gay people does not constitute sex discrimination under Title VII. 6 One of the most well-known cases that represents this point
of view is Desantis v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph,47 which consisted of three
4
separate lawsuits brought by gay employees against their California employers. "
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied the plaintiffs' claims in all three
lawsuits.49
The court ruled that Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act's prohibitions against
sex discrimination could not be applied to the type of sexual orientation discrimination exhibited in the three cases.' ° "Congress had only the traditional notions of
'sex' in mind [when it passed Title VII]," the court reasoned, and it should not be
"extended to include sexual preference such as homosexuality."'" Other courts have
made similar rulings.52
A.

45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
46. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
47. 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
48. See id at 328. Unless otherwise noted, the facts that follow are from Desantis,608 F.2d at 328-29, and
refer to this citation. One of these suits was a class action suit brought by gay men against the phone company, who
said that they had been denied job offers, harassed by coworkers and supervisors, and driven to quit. In another suit
brought by two gay women against the phone company, the women argued that they had been ostracized and
insulted by coworkers, refused help by their union representatives, and ultimately fired. In the third suit, a man said
that he was fired from his nursery school job because he was seen wearing an earring before the start of the school
year. See id.
49. See id. at 328.
50. See id. at 329-34.
51. Id. at 329-30.
52. See Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas and Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 1996); Garcia v. Elf Atochem, 28
F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994); Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 766, at *22 (6th Cir. 1992)
(ruling that even though a gay man was assaulted and verbally harassed because he was gay, he was not protected
under Title VII); Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978) (ruling that discrimination against
a man because he was effeminate does not constitute sex discrimination); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards and Sons,
Inc., 876 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that homosexuality is a status not protected by Title VII); Torres v. Nat'l
Precision Blanking, 943 F. Supp. 952, 954 (N.D. Hi.1996) (ruling that a male harasser's conduct, which included
inserting his finger into [the male plaintiff's] rectum and bragging about it to other coworkers, did not constitute
illegal sexual harassment because "the term 'sex'... connotates 'gender' not sexual prefrence."); Carreno v. Local
226, Int'l Bhd. Elec. Workers, No 89-4083-S, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13817, at *7 (D. Kan. Sept. 27, 1990); see
also Harassmentof Homosexual Not Discriminatory,67 EQUAL OPPoRTUNrrIEs REV., May-June 1996, at 48
(discussing British Employment Appeals Tribunal decision in Smith v. GardnerMerchant, Ltd., (13 February
1996), where the court decided that "the campaign [of harassment] alleged to have been adopted against the
appellant was not because he was a man, but because he was a homosexual"); Clare Dyer, Lesbian Couple Lose
Test Case on Job Perks, 10 UK NEws-GUARDIAN WEEKLY, March 1, 1998, at 10 (discussing recent decision by
the European Court of Justice that a British company was not guilty of violating the European Community's (EC)
directive against sex discrimination when it refused to grant a lesbian employee travel benefits for her partner, even
though similar benefits were given to heterosexual couples, and stating that "[c]ommunity law as it stands at
present does not cover discrimination based on sexual orientation"). But see Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597
F. Supp. 537 (M.D. Ala. 1983) (ruling that harassment of gay employee was discrimination because of sex);
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Of course, for reasons upon which I will elaborate in Part ll, the reasoning
employed by these courts is flawed. Their traditional view of the word "sex"
incorrectly focuses on the biologically-based dimensions of the term (i.e., men have
penises, and women have vaginas), and ignores its culturally constructed dimensions (i.e., men are expected to be logical and decisive, and women are expected to
be emotional and indecisive). Biology and culture are all part of one piece when it
comes to society's ideas about how men and women are and should be, with culture
playing a pivotal role in how gender is regulated.
In fact, the Supreme Court was willing to recognize this very fact with respect
to the kind of stereotypes that are used to keep women from advancing in the work
place in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.53 In Price Waterhouse, the plaintiff, Ann
Hopkins, was denied promotion to partnership in a national accounting firm because
some of the partners felt that she was too "macho [and] ... overcompensated for
being a woman" by using obscene language and behaving in an "overly aggressive"
manner.' The Court reasoned that "in the specific context of sex stereotyping, an
employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or
that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender." 5 Furthermore, the Court
said that in "forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of
their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment
'
of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes."56

MacCauley v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 397 N.E.2d 670,671 (Mass. 1979) (saying that
"discrimination against homosexuals could be treated as a species of discrimination because of sex" under
Massachusetts state sex discrimination law).
It is interesting to note that some judges have found that discrimination and harassment against transsexuals
constitutes sex discrimination in a way that discrimination against gays does not. See Holloway v. Arthur
Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977) (Goodwin, J., dissenting) ("I would not limit the right to claim
discrimination to those who were born into the victim class.... .. This is not a 'sexual preference' case; this is a case
of a person completing surgically that part of nature's handiwork which apparently was left incomplete somewhere
along the line."); Equalityfor Lesbians, supra note 8, at 20 (discussing P. v. S. and Cornwall County Council, a
case where the European Court of Justice said that the EC Equal Treatment Directive, which makes it a
contravention of EC law for a member nation to engage in discrimination based on sex, applies to gender
reassignment because "ft]o tolerate such discnimination would be tantamount... to a failure to respect the dignity
and freedom to which he or she is entitled.'). These views represent the traditional medical model of sex, in which
a person's gender is seen in exclusively binary terms (i.e., one is either male or female, and one is always
heterosexual) and as ultimately immutable (one is either "made" a heterosexual male or female at birth or by
surgery). Thus, because homosexuality is viewed as a choice and therefore mutable, the argument goes, gays do
not deserve to be treated with the same kind of dignity and respect to which a heterosexual man or woman (by birth
or surgery) is entitled.
Of course, the troubling implication of the P. v. S. case is that the only way for a gay person to resolve the
ambiguity and cognitive dissonance created by failure to be exclusively heterosexual, is to have a sex change
operation. One doubts, however, that the European Court realized that a transsexual can, albeit theoretically and
from a health perspective, and most probably dangerously, "change" back again into the sex they were prior to
surgery. As I mentioned earlier, however, I include transsexuals in my definition of the term "gay" because, as the
court cases indicate, they too suffer employment discrimination because of they are seen as gender nonconformists
just as gay people are. See, e.g., Holloway, 566 F.2d at 663 (majority of court denying Title VII protection to a
transsexual woman because "Congress has not shown any intent other than to restrict the term 'sex' to its traditional
meaning").
53. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
54. See id. at 235.
55. Id. at 250.
56. Id. at 251 (citations omitted).
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Arguments to this same effect were made on Oncale's behalf by his attorney and
amici filing briefs in support of his claims.57 The Court, however, was unwilling to
explicitly apply the logic in Priceto Oncale's claim. As the facts to the case show,
however, it had ample evidence to justify such an approach had it wished to do so.
The Oncale Case and Its Predecessors
In 1980, the Equal Opportunity Commission adopted Guidelines that said that
sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination under Title VII if it falls into the
following two categories: 1) quid pro quo harassment (i.e., a demand by a superior
for sex in return for a job benefit or detriment) or 2) hostile environment harassment
(i.e., unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature that has the purpose or effect of causing
a hostile or abusive work environment).5" Oncale sued his employer for hostile
environment harassment.59
Oncale was a straight-identified white male who worked on an offshore oilrig in
an all-male environment.' One of his coworkers taunted him by saying, "You know
you got a cute little ass, boy" and threatened to rape him.6 ' On one occasion, this
same coworker got another male employee to help him pin Oncale down on the
floor while he pulled out his penis and stuck it on Oncale's head.' These same two
men also tried to ram a bar of soap in Oncale's anus while he was trying to take a
shower at work.63
Oncale sued his employer for failing to protect him from sexual harassment
because managers in the company ignored his complaints." The district court,
however, said that he had no right to go to trial because, as the court put it, "Mr.
Oncale, a male, has no cause of action under Title VII for harassment by male coworkers. 6 5 In other words, same sex harassment is not sex discrimination. Sex
discrimination requires some level of opposite sex interaction that involves either
sexual desire, antagonism, or a desire to dominate or denigrate.' The court of
appeals affirmed this decision.6 7
B.

57. See generally Reply Brief Of Petitioner (No. 96-568) (arguing that Title VH forbids an employer from
taking an adverse action against an employee because she or he fails to conform to some stereotype regarding how
women or men should act." (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251-272)); Brief of National Organization on
Male Sexual Victimization, Inc., et aL, as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 1997 WL 471814, at *10, Oncale,
118 S. Ct. 998 (No. 96-568) [hereinafter MacKinnon Brief] (arguing that "[o]ften it is men perceived not to
conform to stereotyped gender roles who are the targets of male sexual aggression."); Brief of LAMBDA Legal
Defense and Education Fund et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 1997 WL 471805, at *26, Oncale,
118 S. Ct. 998 (No. 96-568) [hereinafter LAMBDA Brief] (arguing that "glender stereotyping is often associated
with homosexuality. These connections make particularly broad and untenable Sundowner's proposal to exempt
from coverage of [sic] any sexual harassment that a harasser suggests is tainted by a connection to the victim's or
the harasser's sexual orientation.") (citations omitted).
58. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1991).
59. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1000.
60. See id atlO0-0l.
61. See MacKinnon Brief, supra note 57, at 2.
62. See id.
63. See id at 3.
64. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001.
65. Id.
66. See Lester, The Reasonable Woman, supra note 7 (elaborating on other potential motives for

harassment).
67. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

Neither the district court nor the court of appeals is alone in their view that
opposite sex interaction should be a prerequisite to a sexual harassment claim. In
fact, the first sexual harassment cases to make it to court in the 1970s all involved
opposite sex harassment.68 The same is true for the first two sexual harassment
cases to be decided by the Supreme Court- Meritorv. Vinson' in 1986, and Harris
v. Forklift Systems, Inc. ° in 1993.
The Meritorcase involved a female bank employee who was coerced into having
a sexual relationship with her male supervisor.? The Court concluded that she was
entitled to prove on remand that she was subjected to hostile work environment
harassment. 2 In Harris,the plaintiff claimed that the head of her company called
her "a dumb ass woman" and intimated that she should have sex with him when the
two of them traveled together for work.73 Although extremely upset by his behavior,
the plaintiff did not have a nervous breakdown. 4 Rejecting the defendant's
argument that the only way she could win her claim was if she had had a nervous
breakdown, the Court said that "[s]o long as the environment would reasonably be
perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive, there is no need for it also to be
psychologically injurious. 7 5
Even though both Meritor and Harrisinvolved opposite sex harassment, the
Supreme Court's language in both decisions focused on whether or not the
harassment created a hostile or abusive work environment for the plaintiff, not on
the fact that the harasser was a man and the victim was a woman. This therefore left
room for lower courts to entertain the notion that same sex harassment could be a
cause of action under Title VII. They did so with mixed results.
Three cases from two different circuits, Doe v. City of Belleville,7 6 Carreno v.
Local 226, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers,' and Quick v. Donaldson Co. 7 illustrate
some of the different ways in which this issue was addressed at the lower court level
before the Supreme Court's Oncale decision. Doe was a 16-year-old male who had

68. See, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (1977) (female plaintiff alleging she was sexually harassed
by her male supervisor); Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233 (1976), rev'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979)
(granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant where female employee alleged that her supervisor tried to
engage in quid pro quo harassment).
69. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
70. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
71. See Meritor,477 U.S. at 59.
72. See id at 73.
73. See Harris,510 U.S. at 19.
74. See id. at 370.
75. See id.at 22 (citations omitted). Two other workplace sexual harassment cases were decided by the
Supreme Court since this article was first written and the Oncale case was decided. These cases also involved the
alleged opposite-sex harassment of female plaintiffs by their male superiors. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998) (ruling that, subject to certain conditions, an employer can be held vicariously liable if a
supervisor creates a hostile work environment); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998) (ruling
that supervisory harassment that does not result in tangible job consequences is a form of hostile environment
harassment, and unless the plaintiff fails to avoid the harassment or the employer exercises reasonable care to
prevent it, the employer will be liable for such harassment).
76. 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998), in light ofOncale, 118
S. Ct. 998 (1998).
77. 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13817 (D. Kan. Sept. 27, 1990).
78. 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996).
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a summer job as a groundskeeper for the City of Belleville in 1992."" While there,
his adult male coworkers taunting him by calling him a "fag," a "queer" and a
"bitch". 80 Apparently, the earring that Doe wore was just too much for them to
bear.8 One particular coworker, a former marine having what the court described
as an "imposing stature," 2 engaged in a barrage of hostile behavior towards Doe,
including threatening to force Doe to have anal sex, 3 and grabbing Doe by the
testicles, claiming that he wanted to see if Doe was male or female.8
The Doe court ruled that there was "more than enough evidence to permit the
factfinder to conclude that [the plaintiff] subjectively experienced his workplace as
hostile," that he "was harassed sexually and that his gender played a significant role
in that harassment."8 5 Even though it sidestepped the issue of whether or not Price
Waterhouse overturned the Desantisdecision directly, 6 the court employed the type
of anti-sex-stereotyping analysis found in Price Waterhouse and said that:
because her personality, her figure, her clothing,
A woman who is harassed ...
her hairstyle, or her decision not to wear jewelry or cosmetics is perceived as
unacceptably "masculine" is harassed "because of' her sex .... In the same
way, a man who is harassed because his voice is soft, his physique is slight, his
hair is long, or because in some other respect he exhibits his masculinity in a
way that does not meet his coworkers' idea of how men are to appear and
behave, is [also] harassed "because of' his sex."
The Carrenocourt took a very different stance. The plaintiff in Carrenowas a
self-identified gay man who alleged that he was sexually harassed by male
coworkers who constantly called him a "faggot" and physically assaulted him on
numerous occasions when he worked as a construction worker.88 Despite the fact
that he reported the incidents to his employer and his union representatives, all of
whom took no action to help him, 9 the court concluded that the harassment suffered
by the plaintiff "was not based on his gender... [or] because of his sex."' The
court found instead that the harassment "was encountered because of his sexual
92
preference,"'" and that Carreno was not entitled to protection under Title VII.
In Quick, a self-identified heterosexual male welder who worked in a muffler.
production plant said that his male coworkers taunted him about being a homosex-

79. See Doe, 119 F.3d at 566.
80. Id. at 567.
81. See id.
82. See it
83. See id
84. See id.
85. 1d at 595.
86. See id. at 582 n.17.
87. Id at 581; see also Zalewski v. Overlook Hosp., 692 A.2d 131 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996) (ruling
that New Jersey discrimination law coven male-on-male harassment where target was heterosexual, but considered
effeminate and a virgin).
88. See Canrno v. Local 226, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13817, at *1-2 (D. Kan.
Sept. 27, 1990).
89. See id. at *3-5.
90. See id. at *7.
91. Id.
92. See id. at *8.
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ual and that at least twelve of them "bagged" him (i.e., grabbed or squeezed his
testicles) on 100 separate occasions.93 Eighty-five percent of the 279 employees at
the plant were male, and apparently male-on-male bagging was rampant there. 94 The
court of appeals said that in order for Quick to win his case, he would have to prove
that "members of one sex [were] exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions
of employment to which members of the other sex [were] not exposed." 95 Citing the
fact that the treatment of men at the company was worse than the treatment of
women (i.e., many men, but no women were "bagged"), the court concluded that
Quick had met this test.96
As the Doe, Carreno and Quick cases show, prior to the Oncale decision, courts
had taken at least three approaches to the issue of whether or not the harassment of
gay people and other GNC's is sex discrimination. According to the Carrenocourt,
it is only sex discrimination when it involves opposite sex heterosexual harassment.
According to the Quick court, the phrase "because of sex" means that it is only
illegal harassment when the harasser singles out members of one sex, while leaving
members of the other sex alone.' According to the Doe court, however, the word
"sex" means that harassment can occur regardless of the sex or sexual orientation
of the harasser and the victim, and that the focus should only be on whether the
conduct created a hostile or abusive work environment. 9 Taking the Doe Court's
analysis one step further, one should be able to meet the "because of sex"
requirement by arguing that certain types of harassment are based on an animosity
toward gay people and other GNC's, when that animosity creates a hostile and
abusive work environment. 99
The Supreme Court granted review in Oncale partly for the purpose of resolving
these issues. Following what appears to be a fairly traditional approach to a sex
discrimination claim, it ruled that one of the things that needs to be proven in a
sexual harassment case is that the conduct under review be based on
"discriminat[ion] ... because of... sex."'" Furthermore, it said:

93. See Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1374-75 (8th Cir. 1996).
94. See id.
95. See id. at 1379 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25-26 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)); see
also Yeary v. Goodwill Industries-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 447-448 (6th Cir. 1997) (raising the issue, but

declining to decide, whether male-on-male harassment is only illegal if the harasser is gay, but holding that a Title
VII claim is made out where the harasser is gay, because the harasser targeted a man in a way that he would not
target women).
96. See id.
97. See also II EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA), § 615.2(b) (Jan. 29, 1998) (recognizing that sexual harassment

extends beyond the common case of a supervisor harassing a female employee).
Although the most widely recognized fact pattern is that in which a male supervisor sexually
harasses a female employee, this form of harassment is not the only one recognized by the
EEOC.... Since sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination, the crucial inquiry is
whether the harasser treats a member or members of one sex differently from members of the
other sex.

Id.
98. See Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, at 589-90 (7th Cir. 1997).
99. See, e.g., Gerd v. United Parcel Sery., Inc., 934 F. Supp. 357 (D. Colo. 1996). The Gerd court stated
that "[j]ust as courts do not inquire into the sexual preferences of the victim in cases of opposite sex harassment,
the sexual preference of the victim should be a non-issue in a same-sex sexual harassment case." L at 361 (quoting
Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc. 919 F. Supp. 351, 355 (D. Nev. 1996)).
100. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002 (1998).
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A trier of fact might reasonably find such discrimination, for example, if a
female victim is harassed in such sex-specific and derogatory terms by another
woman as to make it clear that the harasser is motivated by general hostility to
the presence of women in the workplace. A same-sex harassment plaintiff may
also, of course, offer direct comparative evidence about how the alleged
harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex work place.'
This last sentence makes it seem like the Court was endorsing the standard of
analysis articulated in Quick.1" In other words, it expected Oncale to prove on
remand that women in his company were not treated like he had been treated.
However, the Court's use of the words "might," "for example," and "may," as
opposed to "should," left room for the sex stereotyping issue raised by amici and
Oncale's counsel to also be addressed on remand.10 3
Further support for this interpretation can be found in the Court's statement that:
"male-on male sexual harassment.., was assuredly not the principal evil
Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII.... But statutory
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable
evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal
concerns of our legislators by which we are governed."°
Gay rights advocates can cite this part of the decision to challenge those who say
that Congress never intended to prohibit harassment against gay people or other
GNC's when it enacted Title VII."°5 They can also cite Oncale to persuade judges
to allow them to present expert testimony about how stereotyping of male and
female sex roles in our society is a form of sex discrimination that leads to gay
bashing and the harassment of GNC's in general.
PART M: CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
ARGUMENT THAT THE HARASSMENT OF GAYS AND OTHER GENDER
NONCONFORMISTS IS HARASSMENT "BECAUSE OF SEX"
What the Doe, Oncale, Carreno,and PriceWaterhouse cases all have in common
is the attempt on the part of the perpetrator to censure or punish the victim for his
or her behavior, when that behavior that fails to conform to culturally-constructed
stereotypes about how "real men" and "real women" are supposed to look or act.
Harassment in such instances is triggered by the fact that the victim has somehow
transgressed the boundaries of these culturally-constructed stereotypes about what
it means to be a man or a woman in our society. In this sense, it is perhaps the
ultimate kind of sex discrimination.
101. Id. (emphasis added).
102. See Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1379 (8th Cit. 1996); supra text accompanying notes 93-97.
103. See Oncale, 118 S.Ct. at 1002.
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting distinctions
between homosexuals, transvestites and transsexuals, but finding that none of these groups is protected by Title
VID; Desantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th Cir. 1979) (determining that Title VII's
prohibition of sex discrimination should not be judicially extended to include sexual preference such as
homosexuality); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662-63 (9th Cir. 1977) (refusing to expand
Title VII's application to include non-traditional notions of sex).
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For example, Ann Hopkins was a heterosexual, married woman with children.
Hopkins' critics, however, essentially accused her of trying to act like a man, a
commonly held stereotype about lesbians.'0° Similarly, the plaintiff in Doe was a
straight-identified man with a girlfriend, yet he was perceived to be gay because he
exhibited what his harassers considered to be feminine, and therefore male
homosexual, behavior.' °7 Doe was assaulted because he failed to live up to some
unwritten code of masculine conduct. Unfortunately, the situation that took place
in Doe is not unique,"8 and, by implication, neither are the attitudes that prompted
it.
How and Why Gays and Other Gender NonconformistsAre Seen as Traitors to Their BiologicalSex
The popular stereotype is that "real men" should be masculine and that "real
women" should be feminine, despite the reality that a person's biological sex (i.e.,
male or female) is not necessarily dictated by his or her gender (i.e., how they
present themselves to the world in terms of the stereotypical traits usually
associated with their sex). That is why you can have a stereotypically masculine,
heterosexual woman like Ann Hopkins or supposedly feminine heterosexual men
like the plaintiffs in Oncale, Doe and Goluszk. To what extent is someone seen as
either conforming to these stereotypes (i.e., "she is a heterosexual because she is a
woman") or not conforming to them ("she is a woman, but she is a lesbian")? It is
that "but" that I want to explore here--why many people think it, and the extent to
which it motivates some to discriminate against gays and other GNC's. Let me first,
however, describe what those stereotypes are. In other words, how are stereotypes
about what it means to be a "real man" and a "real woman" constructed in this
culture?

A.

1. The Stereotypical "Real Man"
First and foremost, it seems a "real man" needs to have the right body parts and
be able to do the right things with those parts. He's got to have a penis, and he's got
to use it to participate in heterosexual sex for the purpose of procreation. In order
to attain this goal, as psychologist John Money argued in the 1970s, the first thing
the real man has to have is the correct chromosomal sexual makeup (i.e., for males
this is the Y chromosome, for females it's the X chromosome). He then needs to
°
produce the correct hormones at puberty.'O

106. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989).
107. See Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 566-67 (7th Cir. 1997).
108. See, e.g., Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994) (male plaintiffs supervisor
grabbed plaintiff's crotch); Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (plaintiff
alleging that a male coworker subjected him to obscene, sexual language); Fleenor v. Hewitt Soap Co., 67 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1625 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (male plaintiff's supervisor exposed his genitals to the plaintiff,
threatened to force the plaintiff to have oral sex and stuck a ruler in the plaintiff's anus); Goluszek v. H.P. Smith,
697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. nM.1988) (male plaintiff accused of being bisexual or gay and poked in the anus with a
stick).
109. See Anne Fausto-Sterling, How To Build A Man, in CONSTRUCTING MASCULINrrY, supra note 25, at
127, 129 (citing JOHN MONEY & PATICIA TUCKER, SEXUAL SIGNATURE: ON BEING A MAN OR A WOMAN (1975)).
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Nature, however, doesn't always cooperate which such neat little binary
formulas. For example, what happens when a baby boy is born with the "proper"
Y chromosome, but produces a tiny penis that is, for example, six millimeters long?
Many doctors fear that a penis this size will never develop fully enough to
accomplish vaginal penetration for reproductive purposes. Thus, it is apparently
common in the medical profession to surgically remove the penis of such a child,
to reconstruct a vagina and tell the family to raise the child as a girl.11 °
John Money also argued that, in addition to having to exhibit these critical bodily
parts and functions, a "real man" has to "acquire and express a consistent gender
identity role.., and ...be able to reproduce in the appropriate fashion."' In other
words, he must be heterosexual and behave in a masculine manner. Even in cases
where a boy starts out by exhibiting traits that are associated with females,
that the boy be
something that is not that unusual, Money and others recommend
2
acculturated so that he acquires the requisite masculine traits."
The views expressed by Money are still widely held today by people working in
the medical and psychology professions. This is evidenced by the fact that the
American Psychological Association suggests that doctors, who have boy patients
who show a "preoccupation with... cross-dressing or simulating female attire, or
by a compelling desire to participate in the games and pastimes of girls," diagnose
those boys 1as
having "Gender Identity Disorder,"' 3 a mental disorder that needs to
14
be treated.
In the eyes of social constructionists, "men are made, not born....[M]asculinity
[is constructed] through social discourse... everything from music videos, poetry,
rap lyrics to sports, beer commercials and psychotherapy.." They thus would not
be surprised that people in the medical and psychology professions just described
are essentially advocating a form of behavior modification for effeminate boys that
"helps" them acquire the appropriate traits for manhood later in life. They would16
also not be surprised that men like the harassers in the case, Segreto v. Kirschner,"
also tried to acculturate a gender nonconforming adult man by using violence and
coercion. In Segreto, the claimant was called a "fag," "Jimmy the Woman," and
beat up by male coworkers because they believed he was not having sex with a

110. See id. at 130 n.4 (citing Patricia Donahue et al., Clinical Management ofIntersex Abnormalities, 8
CURRENT PROBLEMS IN SURGERY 527 (1991)). Furthermore, they tend to recommend that genetic females,
regardless of the form or size of their genitals, be raised as girls, even if this means that a vagina will have to be
surgically constructed. See Donahue et al., supra at 527; see also Ann Fausto-Sterling, The Five Sexes-Why Male
and Female Are Not Enough, THE SCENCES, Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 20. Fausto argues that there are at least five sexes,
and that "sex is a vast, infinitely malleable continuum that defies the constraints of even [these] five categories."
ld. at 21.

111. See Fausto-Sterling, supra note 109, at 129 (emphasis added).
112. Seeid.
113. See Sedgwick, How to Bring Your Kids up Gay, inFEAR OF A QUEER PLANEr, supra note 10, at 69,71

(citing A.P.A. STAFF, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MErAL DisoRDERs 265-66 (3d ed. 1980)).
114. See id. It should be noted that some psychologists disagree with this approach, and believe that the
underlying motivation for it is homophobia and sexism. See, e.g., Joseph H. Neisen, GenderIdentity Disorderof
Childhood: By Whose Standardandfor What Purpose?A Response to Rokers and Morey, 5 J. OF PSYCH. &
HUMAN SExUALrrY 65-67 (1992).
115. Fausto-Sterling, supra note 115, at 127.
116. 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22057 (D. Conn. March 14, 1997).
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woman he was dating." 7 Similar acts of violence were visited upon the plaintiffs in
Goluszek and Dillon. 18
In addition to needing the appropriate physical characteristics and having to be
heterosexual, masculinity is also supposed to include the ability to exhibit
superiority over women by demonstrating greater physical strength and "mental
propensities (such as men's allegedly superior skill and logic, as manifested in
business, scientific and technological acumen).""' 9 Lack of physical strength and
aggressiveness were what prompted the men in Doe to punish the plaintiff for not
exhibiting those traits.
This seems also to be what prompted Brian, a 27-year-old self-identified
heterosexual, college-educated, white man to commit several criminal assaults
against gay men. n ° Brian was part of a study conducted by forensic psychologist
Karen Franklin to determine what causes self-identified heterosexual men to assault
gay men.' "[He] seemed driven by a visceral contempt for men he perceived as
lacking in physical strength," says Franklin." 2 "More than once during ... [the
interview], he nodded toward certain men walking by-men with slim builds and
studious demeanors-as 'pathetic' examples of prime candidates for assault." '23
"Real men" are also supposed to have louder, deeper voices than women, to be
more aggressive and decisive than women, and not wear the types of ornaments,
makeup, or elaborate hairstyles or clothing associated with women.2 This is what
prompted Eric, another man in Franklin's study, to beat and rob one of his
victims-a male cross-dresser." s When asked why he committed the assault, Eric
"repeatedly described his . . . victim's physical appearance (makeup, female
clothing, and long braided hair) ... [suggesting] that he believed the gender-norm
beliefs upon which he acted... [were] universally shared." '
There are people in the fields of medicine and psychology, however, who are
troubled by the perpetuation of these types of normative expectations about sexbased behavior. For example, psychologist Leonard Glass, describing the ten years
of clinical work he has done with male clients, says that when taken to the extreme,
men who adopt these traits are suffering from a pathological condition: "[R]igid
enforcement, exaggeration, and uncritical glorification of the myriad of perceived
differences in behavior [between men and women] (some portion of which may

117. See id. at *3.
118. See Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. at 1453-4 (unmaried male with no sexual experience accused
of being gay or bisexual and poked in the buttocks with a stick); Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 766, at *1-3 (male postal worker called a "fag" and beat up by his male coworkers because they thought
he acted like he was gay).
119. See Stanley Aronowitz, My Masculinity, in CONSRUCrING MASCULINIY, supra note 25, at 307,31617. Aronowitz actually uses the term "masculism" to describe what I am calling masculinity here.
120. See Franklin,supra note 4, at 5.
121. See id.
122. Id. at 8.
123. Id.
124. See Mary Anne Case, Disaggregating Gender From Sex and Sexual Onentation-The Effeminate Man
in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE LJ. 1-38 (1995) (citing ANNE HOL.ANDER, SEX AND SUMTS
(1994)).
125. See Franklin,supra note 4. at 8.
126. Id.
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originate in biology, to be later subject to environmental influences) is destructive
to both men and women."' 2 7
I would add to this last point by saying that these traits are also destructive to
gays and other GNC's who come into contact with hypermasculine men. This is
particularly problematic since Glass also contends that most of his male clients
exhibit at least some of these symptoms and that "the number [of men] who end up
with... distorted
masculine identities. . . has been profoundly underrecognized in
28
clinical work."'
2. The Stereotypical "Real Woman"
Talking about his experiences in a conservative, Christian high school, Patrick
Hopkins remembers that the "most popular insult/name... used over and over
again [by male athletes], ad nauseam,... was simply, 'girl. "' 9 Since he went to a
school that did not allow the use of obscenities, "girl," he says, "was an allowable
...substitute for 'faggot' [and] 'homo',. . . and thus reveals a common essence of
these insults. It sigifies... as related to the male speaker, 'not-me.""'13 This echoes
Vito Russo's analysis of the portrayal of men in American film in the 1920s, 30s
and 40s, where anything deemed feminine in those films was considered inferior.' 3 '
So, if the real man is supposed to be superior to the feminine woman, what does
it mean to be a real woman? The popular stereotype of the feminine woman is that
she is a person who has "nurtuant warmth, emotional expressiveness, interpersonal
awareness, liveliness and intuitiveness .. . ."" She also is supposed to be
deferential to men, indecisive, have a softer voice, be passive, use makeup, wear
33
ornaments like bracelets and earrings, and wear elaborate hairstyles and clothing.
As one "How-To" book for girls from the 1960s says, "Boys don't like to be
pursued. They think it's funny or they think it's shameless, and they look askance
at any girl who is either."" 4
Lest the reader think these types of stereotypes are no longer relevant in today's
13 5
world, remember that Ann Hopkins was criticized for not being feminine enough.
She did not wear makeup or feminine clothing, and she was definitely not passive
or deferential to men.136 In fact, it was her aggressiveness and decisiveness that lead
her to become the most productive employee in the pool of candidates that went up

127. Leonard L Glass, Man's ManfLadies' Man: Motifs Of Hypermasculinity, 47 PSYCHIATRY 260, 274
(1984).
128. See id,
129. See Patrick D. Hopkins, Gender Treachery: Homophobia, Masculinity, and Threatened Identities, in
RETHINKING MAsCULIm-PHLosoPHICAL EXPLORATIONS INLIGHT OF FEMINISM 95 (Larry May et al. eds.,
1996).
130. See id.at 96; see also ELSABETH BADnTER, XY-ON MASCULiNE IDENTrTY 32-34 (1992).
131. See Russo, supra note 43, at 17.
132. Glass, supra note 127, at 260; see also ELEANORE E. MACCOBY, THE TWO SEXES-GROWING UP
APART, COMING TOGMrHER 6-7 (1998).
133. See Case, supra note 124, at 21.
134. JuDrrH SCOTT UNGER, THE ART OF BEING A GnuL 279 (1963).

135. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989).
136. See id.at 255-56.
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for partnership
that year, and this threatened some of her more powerful male
13 7
colleagues.
Furthermore, simply by trying to work in a predominantly male work environment, some women signal that they refuse to defer to the stereotypical notion that
women cannot and should not work in such environments. This would also explain
why, for example, the men who worked with the saleswoman in Huddleston v.
Roger Dean Chevrolet"' threatened to take her pants off and replace them with a
skirt and to undress her to see if she was "real.' 39
Of course, the other important symbolic mark of being a real woman is
heterosexuality. Thus, even if a lesbian is the kind of woman who dresses and acts
in a feminine manner, she too will be considered by many to be the antithesis of the
real woman simply because she is not heterosexual. As writer Diana Maury has
said, "lesbian inequality is the warning to girls and women not to challenge the
prescribed meaning of being female in this society."" Indeed, women who
challenge sexist behavior are often accused of being lesbians in order to bring them
back into the normative gender line. 4
As my discussion in the previous section shows, "the feminine is viewed as
completely unacceptable in males."' 42 But does the reverse hold true for women?
Apparently, but not to the same degree. Researchers have shown that parents are
much more tolerant of girls who exhibit "boy-like" behavior, like playing with
trucks and dressing in boys' clothes, than they are of boys who exhibit girl-like
behavior, like playing with dolls and putting on girls' clothes. 43 To some extent,
this continues into adulthood. Note the fact, for example, that it is perfectly
acceptable in many contexts for women to wear pants, but44not for men to wear
dresses in any context, except perhaps to perform a parody.'
One explanation for this, called the "social status model," is that we live in a
patriarchal culture that privileges masculinity." 5 Thus, women who display
stereotypical male traits are at worst ignored or at best rewarded, and men who
display stereotypical female traits are demeaned.'" Some have argued that this is
why the Supreme Court ruled that Ann Hopkins' aggressiveness should not be used

137. See id. at 235.
138. 845 F.2d 900 (11th Cir. 1988).
139. See id at902.
140. Cynthia Peterson, Envisioninga Lesbian Equality Jurisprudence,in LEGAL INV msONs--LEsiANS,
GAY MEN AND THE POLrTICS OF LAW 118, 121 (Didi Herman & Carl Stychin eds., 1995) (citing Diana Majury,
Refashioning the Unfashionable: ClaimingLesbian Identities in the Legal Context, 7 CAN. J. WoMEN & L 286,
312 (1994)).
141. See id.
142. Case, supra note 124, at 18.
143. See ELEANOR EMMONS MACCOBY & CAROL NAGY JACKLIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX DIFFERENCES
284, 328 (1974); Donald R. McCreary, The Male Role and Avoiding Femininity, 31 SEX ROLES 517, 518 (1994).

144. See, e.g., Jonathan Rabinovitz, A School Is Split OverBoys in Skirts, N.Y. TIMES (April 3, 1998). The
article discusses a case in Connecticut where a male high school student was suspended for wearing a dress to
school, but then reinstated because of the public outcry and criticism from the American Civil liberties Union.
Some of the boy's male friends protested his suspension by coming to school the next day in dresses. One of the
boys who did this, however, made a point of saying that he only wore the dress in protest and had no plans to wear
one again.
145. McCreary, supra note 143, at 517.
146. See id.at 519.
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as an excuse to thwart her chances for advancement, since aggressiveness in47
in men.'
business is deemed a desirable trait, even if it is usually only acceptable
As Vito Russo has said, "[tihe popular definition of gayness is rooted in sexism.
Weakness in men rather than strength in women has consistently been seen as the
48
connection between sex role behavior and deviant sexuality."'
That is true, as long as women do not go too far. Thus, people like Leslie
Feinberg, who once self-identified as a "stone butch" lesbian, and who wore what
is usually considered men's clothing, complete with tailored pants, suit jackets and
men's underwear, was threatened with violence by non-gays who came into contact
with her. 49 Feinberg, in her book, Stone Butch Blues, tells about the particularly
alarming violence she suffered at the hands of the police and street gangs in the
believed
1950s, 60s and 70s."5 The people who attacked her did so because 15they
perverse. '
she was trying to emulate men, something they viewed as
An interesting twist to the idea that the "real woman" must be feminine, is the
fact that traditionally in this country, ideas about femininity have not5 2usually
included poor and working class women, and especially black women.' Black
women were brought to this country to work right alongside men in the slave
master's fields and do the kind of hard, back-breaking work that is usually
associated with work done by men.' 53 In fact, "the ability to do heavy labor was of
paramount importance on the old Southern plantation. Whereas women who were
sensitive, delicate and fragile suffered a great deal in slavery ... women who were
physically strong and robust were highly valued by the slave community."'"
Largely because racism has made it hard for black men to be able to support their
families, black women have always worked outside the home, and often play the
kind of decisive, leadership role in families that is not usually associated with the
passive, deferential, white feminine ideal.' 55 This does not mean, however, that
heterosexual black women or their male partners have not often wished it would be
otherwise. 5 6 Thus, as gays of all colors have been labeled perverse for failing to

147. See Case, supra note 124, at 3. Case discusses how courts have been willing to find that Title Vii's

prohibitions on sex discrimination protect straight-identified masculine women, but not feminine men. This often
results, she argues, in feminine gay men not being able to successfully make the argument that they are victims of
sex discrimination because they fail to conform to stereotypical notions about proper male behavior. See id.
148. Russo, supra note 43, at 4-5.
149. See LESLIE FEINBERG, STONE BUTCH BLUES 62-63, 257-59 (1993).

150. See id Feinberg's book also explores how class differences, namely her working class status, shaped

her experiences. See generally iL
151. See id.
152. See MICHELE WALLAcE, BLACK MACHO AND THE MYTH OF THE SUPERWOMAN (1970).
153. See id at 20.
154. See id
155. Julianne Malveaux, Gender Difference and Beyond: An Economic Perspective on Diversity and
Commonality of Women, in THEORETICAL PERSPECtIVES ON SEXUAL DFfERENCE 226-238 (Deborah Rhode ed.,
1990). Referring to U.S. Labor Department statistics, economist Malveaux says that "Black women are more likely
to work full time than are white women; when they work part-time, it is mom likely for economic reasons than is
white women's part-time work." See id. at 230 (citing BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR,
EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS 32 (Jan. 1987)).
156. See id at 233. For example, Malveaux argues that "Black men, because of racial occupational segregation, were denied the opportunity to earn a family wage, so black women worked because they had to." Id. In fact,
after the Civil War, many former slaves sought to emulate the dominant white ideology by having their previous
relationships "legitimized" by marriage, and embracing middle-class views like the importance of female purity
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meet the dominant, as well as their own, culture's expectations about their
biological sex, so too have black women, who have been characterized as traitors
to their gender because they are "too strong, [and] too hard."' 57
In fact, part of the rhetoric of the nationalist black power movement of the 1960s,
was to restore black women to their "proper" role as passive, heterosexual
supporters of their male husbands and lovers. The connection between sexism,
homophobia, and nationalism will be discussed in the next section below.
B.

The Connection Between Sexism, Homophobia and Nationalism
Talking about how the flames of anti-immigrant sentiments have been incited
throughout history, Kenneth Karst has said that "distrust can ripen into hostility and
even into the rupture of the social fabric."' 58 Similar comments can be made about
how homophobia, which is a distrust of difference based on sexuality, is often used
as a device for nation building, one in which the failure of men to be masculine is
seen as unpatriotic' 5 9 and something that renders the nation vulnerable to foreign
enemy attack."6 This is why nationalist ideologues often advocate that gays either
need to be acculturated into the heterosexual norm or eliminated altogether. 6 '
Some important work has been done by history and psychiatry professor Sander
Gilman on how this dynamic was exploited in Germany during the early 1900s.'62
He points to how the creation of the idea of the "true German" entailed the
devaluing and marginalization of Jewish people. 6 3 At the time, it was widely
believed and articulated by members of the medical profession that the circumcision
of Jewish men was proof of their essentially different nature, a difference that was
"closely associated with the pathological category of the 'homosexual.""" This
type of thinking, as political scientist Zillah Eisenstein contends, results in the
reduction of Jewish manhood to a cultural stereotype, one in which the Jew is
equated with a "circumcised penis, which bespeaks a partial lack of the true phallus,
which in turn suggests the female."' 65

and the male-headed household. See JOHN D'EMUO & BlEux FREEDMAN, A HISORY OF SEXUALITY INAMERICA
104-05 (1988) (citing Elizabeth Peck, The Two Parent Household: Black Family Structure in Late Nineteenth Century Boston, in THE AMERICAN FAMILY INSOCIAL HISTORICAL PERmwrUvE 152-178 (Michael Gordon ed., 1973)).
157. See WALLACE, supra note 152 at 11.
158. KENNErn KARS'r,BELONGING TO AMERICA-EQUAL CmZENSHIP AND THE CONSTIrUTION 89 (1989).
159. See Sander L Gilman, Damaged Men-Thought's on Kafka's Body, in CONSTRUCTING MASCUuNrTY,
supra note 25, at 176 (citing GEORGE MOSSE, NATIONALISM AND SEXuALrrY: MIDDLE-CLASS MoRALrrY AND
SEXUAL NORMS INMODERN EUROPE 17 (1985), inwhich Mosse, in one of the first works to address this dynamic,
showed how middle-class ideas about sexuality were strongly linked to the emergence of nationalism in modem
Europe, which in turn was linked to the rise of fascism in 20th century Europe); see also WEEKS, supra note 20,
at 22 (saying that in western capitalist societies such as ours, "[m]ale homosexuality has been seen as a
...perceived challenge to the male heterosexual role within capitalism").
160. See, e.g., Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALTY 267,
273 (Carol Vance ed., 1989) (discussing the viewpoint of Norman Podhoretz, who blamed "homosexuals for the
alleged inability of the United States to stand up to the Russians in 1977").
161. See Gilman, supra note 159, at 178-87. There is' no room for those who are traitors to their sex, the
argument goes, because such people are also traitors to the nation.
162. See id
163. See id at 181.
164. See id. at177.
165. ZILLAH EISENSTEIN, HATREDS: RACALIZED AND SEXUAuZ.ED CONFLICrS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 26
(1996).
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A similar type of rhetoric was used during the black nationalist movement in the
1960s in the United States. As Michele Wallace argues in her book, The Myth of the
Black Macho, people like the Black Panthers and other radical black male civil
rights activists espoused a view of black nationhood and empowerment that was
equated with a high degree of heterosexual, male hypermasculinity.'6 Agreeing
with Wallace, writer and scholar Henry Louis Gates has said that "an almost
and
obsessive motif... [that] runs through the major authors of the Black Aesthetic
67
the Black Power movements... [is the sexualization of] national identity."
Citing a commient made by black nationalist Amiri Baraka that "most American
white men are trained to be fags, ' Ie" Gates says that against the backdrop of a black
power movement race war, anyone that crossed the line of heterosexuality was
deemed a traitor." Cornel West, however, has explained that "a lot of paranoid
dispositions become more salient and more visible" when any community
undergoes the kind of deep crisis and dissolution that is currently being experienced
by the black community. 7 ° When this type of crisis occurs, says West, "we see the
scapegoating of the most vulnerable: black women, gays, and lesbians."''
This would explain why, as cultural critic Bell Hooks has argued:
Many heterosexual black men in white supremacist patriarchal culture have
acted as though the primary "evil" of racism has been the refusal of the
dominant culture to allow them full access to patriarchal power, so that in sexist
terms they are compelled to inhabit a sphere of powerlessness, deemed
"feminine"... Much black male homophobia is [therefore] rooted in the desire
to eschew connection with all things deemed "feminine" and that would, of
course, include black gay men.'
I do not mean to imply here that Blacks are more homophobic than other groups,
however. In fact, studies have shown that Blacks are no more homophobic than
majority culture Whites.'7 3 I merely focus on black nationalist ideologies here to
show how homophobia is often linked to nationalism. Hand-in-hand with this
perspective is the idea that a nation's strength and continuity is based on its

166. WALLACE, supra note 152.
167. See Henry Louis Gates, The Black Man's Burden, in FEAR OF AQUEER PLANEr, supra note 10, at 234.
168. See id at 233.
169. See id.
170. Vitka Eisen & Mary Kenyetta, Cornel West on Heterosexism and Transformation:An Interview, 66
HARV. ED. R. 356, 359 (1996).
171.

Id.

172. BL.L HOOKS, Is ParisBurning?,in BLACK LOOKS-RAcE AND REPRESENATION 145, 147 (1992); see
also Evelyn M. Hammonds, Towards a Genealogy of Black Female Sexuality: The Problematicof Silence, in
FEMINIST GENEALOGIES, COLONIAL LEGACIES, DEMOCRATIC FUTURES 170, 180-181 (M. Jacqui Alexander &

Chandra Talpade Mohanty eds., 1997) (stating that "black feminist theoring about black female sexuality has,
with a few exceptions... been focused relentlessly on heterosexuality" and that "some heterosexual black women
cast black lesbians as proverbial traitors to the race"); Cheryl Potgieter, From Apartheid to Mandela's
c..
Constitution:Black South African Lesbians in the Nineties, in 3 ETHNIC AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY AMONG
LESBIANS AND GAY MEN--PSYCHoLOGIcAL PERsPEcrvEs ON LESBIAN AND GAY IssUEs (Beverly Gren ed., 1997)
(describing that before the new South African constitution under Nelson Mandela was adopted, which includes a
nondiscrimination clause concerning sexual orientation, there was much debate about whether or not homosexuality
was an un-African derivative of perverse Western European influences).
173. See generally Gregory Herek, Black Heterosexuals' Attitudes towards Lesbians and Gay Men in the
United States, in JOURNAL OF SEX RESEARCH 95-105 (1995).
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families, especially families who represent the pure, authentic ethnic bloodlines of
the dominant group. 74 In the words of Michel Foucault, homophobia is "motivated
by one basic concern: to ensure population, to reproduce labor capacity, to
perpetuate the form of social relations, in short, to constitute a sexuality that is
economically useful and politically conservative." 175
Thus, procreation becomes key to nation building, and gays are not seen as
having a role in that process. The homophobia inherent in most nationalist
ideologies can lead to tragic consequences for gay people, including efforts by the
state to annihilate them. Heinrich Himmler, leader of Hitler's elite SS corps, was
a prime endorser of this view. In a speech delivered in Germany in 1937, he said:
[T]wo million men killed in... [World War I] plus two million homosexuals
equaled four million German women without husbands .... A "good race"
producing few children is destined to be extinct in two hundred years, while
"nations with many children can gain supremacy and mastery of the world."' 176
Ironically, in pre-World War II Berlin, gays enjoyed a wide degree of tolerance. In
fact, a gay liberation movement of sorts was spear-headed by people like Magnus
Hirschfeld, a gay Jewish physician who sought to overturn the German law that
made same-sex acts between men illegal."7 As the result of the extensive studies on
sexuality he conducted at his Institute for Sexual Research, Hirschfeld argued that
7
the laws against gay sex should be decriminalized. 1
However, when Hider was named Chancellor of Germany in 1933, all of these
inroads would soon be destroyed. He took the advice of Himmler, who said that
homosexuals (especially male homosexuals), were like Jews and other flawed, less
than human, non-Aryan outsiders.' 79 As a result, many gay Germans were sent to
concentration camps during the Second World War and made to wear what has now
become the symbol of the gay liberation movement-the pink triangle.' In the
camps, they suffered brutal assaults and also death. It is estimated that "in 1945,
when the camps were liberated, the mortality rate of the homosexuals was higher
than that of the other units investigated."''
Ironically, what makes the rhetoric of nationalism particularly hypocritical is that
most nationalist ideologies, like the ones just described, have a special affinity for
male society and bonding." Unfortunately, similar rhetoric that pits homosexuality
against nationhood, race, and family is still with us today. Witness the statement
made in 1989 by Senator William Dannemeyer, who said that "the heterosexual
ethic ... is the foundation of our civilization."'' 83
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This, of course, is ironic, given the increased use by lesbians of artificial insemination for the purposes
pregnant.
FOUCAULT, supra note 29, at 36-37.
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The Connection between the Homophobe's Repressed Sense of Self and
Homophobia
People like Princeton professor Diana Fuss have argued that, a heterosexual's
very identity only has meaning "in relation to 'homosexuality'; [and that] the
coherence of the former is built on the exclusion, repression, and repudiation of the
latter." 4 In other words, crucial to his sense of self as a heterosexual is the "real
man' s" belief that he is not a homosexual. As such, the real man's very identity is
based on the exclusion, repression and repudiation of any aspects of himself that
5
may make him feel or appear to be like a woman, and therefore homosexual."
"This division between homosexual (unnatural) and heterosexual (natural)," as
Zillah Eisenstien explains, "is then written on the body through a system of signs:
color, musculature, sex, [and] gender .... [Then this] difference-outside the
construct of heterosexual-is treated as strangeness. And strangers are easy to
distance and blame."'' 6 Apparently, this is especially true when the stranger is a
homosexual male. Psychologist Leonard Glass, talking about his hypermasculine
male clients, says that "where homosexual concerns are unconsciously prominent,
the Man's Man chiefly fears anal penetration, and establishes a variety of wellrationalized characterologic defenses against the experience of this dread, including
the persecution of homosexuals." '8 7
The dangers for a man, first to himself, and then to others, are many. "Because
the Man's Man has broadly disassociated himself from women.. .," says Glass, "he
has chronically sacrificed opportunities to learn about both himself and potential
18 I would add to this by saying that such a man has also
female intimates.""
sacrificed opportunities to learn about aspects of his sexuality that reach beyond the
heterosexual norm. In fact, some men may actually have either conscious or
repressed homosexual tendencies. Instead of facing those tendencies, however, they
often lash out against gay men. As Glass argues, "the repressive sees and fears
becoming that, and must distance himself from that.. ., often by overcompensating,
revealing his repression through his obsession, sometimes through active
malignancy-assaulting or killing or merely registering disgust at that which he
hates embodied in what he desires."' 8 9
Similar arguments have been made about the tendency of Whites to self-define
themselves in relation to Blacks, with Blacks being portrayed in a negative light and
Whites being depicted in a decidedly positive light. Or, as the British historian and
film critic Richard Dyer says in his book, White, white people tend to project their
C.

216 (1989) (quoting William E. Dannemeyer).
184. Steven Seidman, Identity Politicsin a "Postrodern"Gay Culture, in FEAR OF AQUEER PLANEr, supra
note 10, at 130.
185. See Hopkins, supra note 129, at 96-97.
186. EISENSTEIN, supra note 165, at 30.
187. Glass, supra note 127, at 262. It should be noted that Glass does not think that fear of being homosexual
is the only reason for hypermasculinity. He cites other contributing factors, such as developmental issues, that may
cause it. See id.
188. Id. at 263.
189. Hopkins, supra note 129, at 109.
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"sexuality onto dark races ... [which enable them] to represent yet disassociate
themselves from their own desire."''
In her book, Playing in the Dark, Pulitzer Prize winner Toni Morrison echoes
these remarks.191 She explores the works of several white American writers who
make up part of the American literary canon (i.e., Poe, Hemingway, Twain,
Faulkner, and Cather, among others)."9 "Just as entertainers, through... blackface,
could render permissible topics that otherwise would have been taboo, so American
writers were able to employ an imagined Africanist persona to articulate and
imaginatively act out the forbidden in American culture," '93 she says. This is why,
"at the level of representation, Whites remain, for all their transcending superiority,
dependent on non-Whites for their sense of self."'
Law scholar Kenneth Karst has shown how this dynamic was used to draw a
connection between race, manhood, and citizenship during the Civil War in
America.'9 5 At the beginning of the war, many Blacks volunteered to serve in the
Union army, but the law only allowed adult white male citizens to do so.'" This was
because, Karst says, "to men at high and low levels in white society, black manhood
suggested a new and disquieting form of rivalry, and the Union cause [therefore]
had to be a 'white man's war."' 197
Karst argues that male rivalry for access to power is a critical component of the
concept of masculinity in our society, and one of the best places to get access to
power is to serve in the military.9' Thus, for white men in the north, especially
lower class white men who felt threatened by the prospect that freed Blacks might
take jobs that were already in short supply, denying black men a traditional way of
expressing manhood served to bolster their self-esteem by making them feel like
real men. 99 As he so aptly puts it, "[o]ne standard mode of repression of our
negative identities is to project them onto other people, and especially onto
members of groups that have been subordinated."
Karst says that his analysis was inspired in part by the work of feminist
psychologist Nancy Chodorow and her 1978 book, The Reproduction of
Mothering."1 In the book, Chodorow suggests that young boys fear and perceive
their mothers as all-powerful and devouring and separate from them in order to
develop a different, more "masculine" identity, one in which stereotypically

190. RICHARD DYER, WlrE 28 (1997).
191. See generally TONI MORRISON, PLAYING INTHE DARK-WHrIES AND THE LITERARY IMAGINATION
(1992).
192. See generally id.
193. id. at 66.
194. DYER, supra note 190, at 25.
195. See Kenneth L Karst, The Pursuit ofManhood and the Desegregation of the Armed Forces., 38 UCLA
L REv. 499 (1991).
196. See id. at 502.
197. Id.
198. See generally id
199. See id. at 508.
200. Id.
201. NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF
GENDER (1978).
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feminine traits are considered flawed.' The idea of the repressed person who
projects feared and repulsive aspects of himself onto others, however, is much older
than work of either Karst or Chodorow. Sigmund Freud talked about it in 1900 in
his Interpretation of Dreams. °3 And Carl Jung developed his concept of the
"shadow" self in the 1920s to address it.2
Jung believed that, because people tend to hold idealized images of themselves,
they have a very difficult time recognizing their own failings and end up projecting
them (i.e., their "shadow self') on to others. 5 He further asserted that, "in dreams
the Shadow appears as a "shady" character of dubious integrity, possessing
... characteristics customarily regarded by... [the dreamer] as disreputable and
'inferior."'" For white people, typically the Shadow appears in a dream as
someone who is dark-skinned and considered to be a member of an inferior race.
Racism is therefore to a great extent a shadow projection by the dominant group
onto members of the subordinated group.' The same could be said for gay people
of all colors, when it comes to how they are conceived in the minds of many
heterosexuals. And, given the unique double identity that a gay person of color has,
he or she provokes a particularly troublesome level of anxiety in the repressed white

person's unconscious mind.
The idea of a repressed homophobe is particularly relevant in cases where courts
have said that one should inquire into the sexual orientation of the harasser before
determining if illegal harassment took place. These courts say that cases involving
same-sex harassment are only illegal if the harasser is gay.' °) Aside from the
incredibly burdensome task of having to prove a litigant's sexual orientation, it is
also possible that a harasser who self-identifies as heterosexual could be a

202. See generally id. But see Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality,supra note 38, at 34, 43 (criticizing
Chodorow and Dinnerstein for failing to see heterosexuality as anything other than a choice and questioning "the
... perspective... that the male need to control women sexually results from some primal male 'fear of women'
.... It seems more probably that men really fear not... that women want to smother and devour them, but that
women could be indifferent to them altogether." Id. at 43.
203. See SIGMUND FREUD, INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS (1955).
204. See generally,e.g., CARL GuSrAV JUNG, THE ARCHETMPS AND THE COUECrIVE UNCONSCIOUS (R.F.C.
Hull trans., Pantheon Books 1959).
205. See ANTHONY STEvENs, ARCHETYPES-A NATURAL HISTORY OF THE SELF 216 (1983) (citing CARL
JUNG, THE COLECTED WORKS OF C.G. YOUNG, Vol. 13, para. 335 (1953-1960)). It should be noted that some
scholars have criticized Jung for failing to recognize how his own shadow projections influenced, and even
prejudiced, his work, especially his analysis of Asian cultures and spirituality. See, e.g., Farhad Dalal, Jung: A
Racist, 4 BRITISH J. OF PSYCHOTHERAPY 263 (1988). Despite his own personal failings in this regard, Jung's ideas
still have much to teach us about homophobia and racism, including his own.
206. Id. at 215.
207. See id.
208. See Fredette v. BVP Mgmt. Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503, 1505 (11 th Cir. 1997) (stating that a homosexual
harasser's motives are the same as that of a heterosexual harasser-that is, that the homosexual harasser is sexually
interested in a member of his or her sex); Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 447-448 (6th
Cir. 1997); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 141 (4th Cir. 1996); Hopkins v. Baltimore, No. 951209, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 3833, at *22 (4th Cir. March 5, 1996) ("[A] male employee who undertakes to prove
sexual harassment directed at him by another male may use evidence of the harasser's sexual homosexuality to
demonstrate that the action was directed at him because he is a man.... [P]roof of such homosexuality must
include more than 'merely suggestive' conduct"); McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191,
1195-96 (4th Cir. 1996); Pritchett v. Sizeler Real Estate Mgmt. Co., No. 93-2351, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5565,
at *6 (E.D. La. April 25, 1995) ("To conclude that same gender harassment is not actionable... is to exempt
homosexuals from the very laws that govern the workplace conduct of heterosexuals.").
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homosexual whose repressed sexual orientation is not provable. 2' Absent
psychological records to this effect, however, there would be no way to show that
such a person is latently gay. Thus, hypermasculine men with latent homosexual
inclinations who don't seek help in therapy, but who end up harassing gay men at
work, would be able to escape the legal system unscathed. Surely, this is not the
result that those who enforce Title VII should promote.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As stated earlier and as the facts in many of the cases discussed in this article
show, people diverge widely from culturally constructed sex-based stereotypes.
Gender (the presentation of stereotypically sex-based traits) and biological sex (a
person's genitalia) are not the same thing. Nevertheless, gay people and other
GNC's are constantly ostracized for not exhibiting the stereotypical traits associated
with their biological sex. That is why discrimination and harassment against gays
and other GNC's is a form of sex discrimination.
Gay men and non-gay men who are perceived to be gay, especially those who
behave in stereotypical feminine manner, seem to be subjected to some of the most
vehement forms of homophobia. This is because the stereotype is that real men are
not supposed to be feminine. Also, while at the same time put on a pedestal in our
culture, the feminine is also held in disdain. Women, and any men who "act like
women," are therefore considered inferior to their masculine, heterosexual,
counterparts. Thus, as the Oncale, Doe, Segreto, and other cases examined here
show, where there is anti-gay male animus, there is also misogyny.
Lesbians, especially those who exhibit more stereotypically masculine traits,
have a much longer leash to pull on than feminine men at work, at least in light of
the Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse. This is probably because, since
it is acceptable for women in our society to exhibit some degree of masculinity
without provoking a homophobic response, lesbians, as such, are less easy to "see"
and thus less vulnerable to homophobic attack as lesbians. As is the case with all
women, though, all lesbians (regardless of whether they exhibit stereotypical
masculine, feminine or even androgynous traits) are always vulnerable to the same
type of sexism to which heterosexual women are susceptible, as statistics about the
frequency of sexual harassment and rape of women no doubt indicate.2 0

209. See LAMBDA Brief, supra note 57, at *17-18. Discussing the havoc that would be wreaked if the Court
were to require that the sexual orientation of the harasser be inquired into, LAMBDA said:
[11f Sundowner's submission of evidence that [Oncale's harasser] is married to a woman is
relevant to its culpability because it sought to be offered as circumstantial evidence that he did
not act against Oncale out of sexual desire, then would evidence that he was sexually aroused
when he assaulted Oncale affect a finding of liability?... Is a person's self-definition as to
sexual orientation rebuttable? In different-sex cases, would men or women accused of
harassment be absolved if they... are willing to say they are gay .... Would same-sex
experience need to be substantiated? Would attraction suffice?...
... Conditioning Title VII liability on a finding concerning a harasser's potential for sexual
attraction to a person of the particular gender would legitimize extraordinarily broad, unsavory
inquiries and result in many employers escaping liability.
Id at *17-19.
210. For statistics on rape, see MARGARET GORDON& STuPHANiE RIGER, THE FEMALE FEAR-THE SOCIAL
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At some point, though, any woman who crosses the invisible boundary line that
divides acceptable from unacceptable sex-based conduct will be subjected to
homophobic-based harassment as well, whether she is heterosexual or gay. Thus,
while people who live in a patriarchal culture may understand on some level why
women would want to embrace the privileges of manhood, these same men will
never let lesbians or straight women, or gay men for that matter, ever fully reap its
socio-political benefits. This will particularly be the case in industry sectors where
the model of the perfect employee is the macho male (i.e., steel mills, oilrigs, police
departments, fire departments, etc.) or where the field is generally dominated at the
higher ranks by men.2 '
Furthermore, although I happen to believe that racism is more pervasive in our
society today than homophobia, some important comparisons can be drawn between
these two "isms." For instance, while it may be expected and even applauded by
some Whites when a heterosexual African-American, for example, discards his or
her "ethnic" mode of dress and speech, successfully educates him or herself in top
white universities and otherwise tries to be assimilated into mainstream white
culture, the African-American will probably never be fully embraced as a valued
equal by whites." 2 In the same sense, no matter how hard gay men and women "fit"
societal norms associated with their sex (i.e., gay men who seem masculine or
lesbians who seem feminine), the very fact that they engage in or aspire towards
non-mainstream sexual and romantic affiliations will probably always cause them
to be seen, and in many circles, vilified as unwelcome outsiders.213
Thus, despite their actual experiences, gays and other GNC's are constantly
subjected to discrimination and harassment at work. Of course, the best and most
direct way to combat harassment motivated by homophobia is for policy makers in
Congress to enact a law that specifically prevents discrimination against gay people

CosT OF RAPE 35 (University of Illinois
Press 1991) (citing Census Bureau statistics, which showed that in 1980,
for example, 140 per 100,000 women said that they had been raped). For statistics on sexual harassment, see 1995
Report, supra note 5,at 13.
211. See 1995 Report, supra note 5,at 17 (saying that victims of sexual harassment ae most likely to work
almost completely with members of the opposite sex).
212. Two excellent personal accounts of this dynamic are JILL NELSON, VOLUNTEER SLAVERY-MY
AUTHENTIC NEGRO EXPERIENCE (1994) (talking about her experience working as a reporter for the Washington
Post) and GWENDOLYN M. PARKER, TRESPASSING-MY SOJoURN INTHE HALLS OF PRIVILEGE (1997) (discussing
her experiences as a lawyer working in corporate America).
Infact, conservative free market law scholars like Richard Posner and Richard Epstein believe that even in cases
where such a person applies for a job and is the most qualified, an employer is justified in refusing to hire that
person because of perceived stereotypes about the general inferiority and unproductivity of their race. Posner and
others call this type of discrimination "statistical discrimination" and believe that since it would be too costly for
an employer to find out if the individual applicant actually isthe most qualified, the employer is justified in falling
back on his belief that the stereotypes are correct and hiring a less qualified white person.
For a more in depth discussion of this theory, and my critique of it, see generally Lester, Efficient But Not
Equitable, supranote 7. On this issue, it is noteworthy that the Supreme Court has stated that "[a]s for the legal
relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or
insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group." Price Watehose v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
251 (1989).
213. Also, while gay men or men who are perceived to be gay may be subjected to more frequent and more
overt forms of homophobia, lesbians, in addition to being discriminated and victimized by homophobia, bear the
double burden of having to deal with sexism. In the case of both gay men and women and those who are seen or
treated as if they were gay, race, class, religion and various other "identities" can also serve to further burden the
weight of their victimization, most certainly if theirs is a perceived minority status.
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and other GNC's. By way of analogy, an example of the way in which this kind of
protected status can be granted to actual gay people, as well as to those who are
perceived or accused of being gay, is the Americans with Disabilities Act.214 The
Act prevents discrimination in employment against anyone with a disability and
anyone who is perceived as being disabled even when they are not.2 15
However, Congress has failed to enact such a law. Thus, lawyers representing the
claims of gay people and other GNC's should make the following arguments in light
of the Supreme Court's decision in the Oncale case. First, they should argue that
there should be a presumption that harassment against gays and other GNC's, or
what I would call "gender harassment," is a form of disparate treatment sex
discrimination because its effect is to police the boundaries of acceptable malefemale conduct and demeanor in the workplace. This approach is in consonance
with the Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse and the underlying purpose
and spirit of Title VII.
Second, they should also argue that their client's actual sexual orientation should
be irrelevant to any debate about whether or not they can avail themselves of the
above presumption. The focus instead should be on the conduct under review. Was
the conduct offensive and abusive? Did it create a hostile work environment? A
wide variety of situations could cause these two questions to be answered in the
affirmative. Sometimes the harassment might consist of unwanted sexualized
language directed at the plaintiff. Sometimes it might consist of gender-based
derogatory remarks. Thus, the woman who receives repeated and unwanted
propositions for sex by her male coworker, the man who is called a "fag" or a
"bitch" by male and female coworkers, and the woman whose male or female boss
tells her that "all women are stupid and inferior to men," all should be entitled to
protection against gender harassment under Title VII. And the protection should be
available regardless of whether or not anyone else was subjected to this type of
treatment.
If judges are not convinced that there should be such a presumption, then
plaintiffs' counsel should argue that expert testimony should be admitted about this
connection. The testimony should engage in the type of analysis I cover in Part III.
As I said at the beginning of this article, this means that plaintiffs' counsel will now
have to tackle this issue case by case, circuit by circuit, but since the harassment of
gays and other GNC's at work is a serious problem that needs to be addressed, the
strategy I have outlined here is definitely worth the effort.

214. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,42 U.S.C. § 12012 (1994).
215. See id at § 12102(2)(C).

